respecting such objects, and in such degrees, and of the several actions consequent thereupon. In this survey, It approves of one, disapproves of another, and towards a third is affected in neither of these ways, but is quite indifferent. This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves of his heart, temper, and actions, is conscience—for this is the strict sense of the word, though sometimes it is used so as to take in more/'* This greatest of all ethical writers tells us farther—" There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions, which passes judgment upon himself, and upon them pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good, others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust, which, without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and disapproves or condemns him, the doer of them, accordingly, and which, if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always, of course, goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence which shall hereafter second and affirm Its own/'f

THIRDLY, CONSCIENCE MAY BE CONSIDERED AS POSSESSING A CLASS OF EMOTIONS, OR AS A SENTIMENT. We have endeavoured, indeed, to show that it is not a mere emotion, or class of emotions. But while it is something more than a " class of feelings'[7]—it is so described by Mackintosh—it does most assuredly contain and imply feelings. The mind is as conscious of the emotions as it is of the judgment.

In opposition to those who insist that there is nothing but emotion, it might be urged in a general way, that emotions never exist independently of certain conceptions or ideas. Let a man stop himself at the time when emotion is the highest, when passion Is the strongest, and he will find, as the substratum of the whole, a mental apprehension or representation of an ob-

ject. There is an idea acting as the basis of every feeling, and so far determining the feeling: and the feeling rises or falls according as the conception takes in more or less of that which raises the emotions. The ideas which raise emotions have been called (by Alison In his Essay on Taste) "ideas of emotions."

* Human Nature, Sermon i.

† Human Nature, Sermon ii. An analysis of the decisions of the conscience will be found in sec. i. of the next chapter of this treatise.